deploy-agent: Rust deployment automation (server + stub + signed payloads)

- Workspace: common (protocol/crypto/tarball), server (axum+rustls), stub (registration, poll, verify-before-execute)
- Ed25519 payload signing + request-signature auth on /poll, /report
- flate2/miniz_oxide pure-Rust tarball, no system deps
- CI matrix: linux musl x86_64/aarch64, windows x86_64
- Compiles clean: cargo build --workspace, 0 errors 0 warnings

SPEC.md

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+# Deploy-Agent — Build Spec
+
+A deployment automation system: a lightweight stub agent that runs on target machines,
+polls a control server over HTTPS:443, downloads signed payloads, verifies signatures,
+and executes them. Rust everywhere.
+
+## Project root
+`/home/node/.openclaw/workspace/tools/deploy-agent/`
+
+Layout:
+```
+tools/deploy-agent/
+├── Cargo.toml            # workspace: members = ["server", "stub", "common"]
+├── common/               # shared crate: protocol types, crypto, payload format
+├── server/               # control server
+├── stub/                 # target-machine agent
+├── payloads/             # sample payload tarballs + signing scripts
+├── README.md             # architecture, threat model, build, deploy
+└── justfile or Makefile  # build targets
+```
+
+## Targets
+- Linux x86_64 (primary) — musl static, rustls
+- Linux aarch64 — musl static, rustls
+- Windows x86_64 — Win 10/11, rustls (NOTE: modern Rust 1.94 has NO win7 targets; protocol must stay OS-agnostic so a legacy win7 build can be added later without server changes)
+
+## Stub behavior (stub/)
+- Register once on first run: generate Ed25519 identity keypair, send public key + machine ID → server issues per-machine client cert (or server stores pubkey for challenge). Same ID reused on subsequent runs.
+- Poll `POST /poll` with machine id + auth. Server returns instruction or "no-op".
+- Instruction types (whitelist, NOT raw shell):
+  - `fetch-payload`: download tarball from server, verify Ed25519 signature, extract
+  - `run-payload`: execute the verified payload (a bundled script/binary per-platform)
+  - `report-status`: return result + logs to server
+- TLS: rustls (Linux/Windows). No OpenSSL for Linux (stays static). Windows 10/11 uses rustls too.
+- Compression: flate2 with miniz_oxide backend (pure Rust, zero system deps).
+
+## Server behavior (server/)
+- axum + rustls + rustls-acme (Let's Encrypt auto-provision on :443)
+- mTLS client cert auth for stubs
+- Per-machine instruction store (JSON file or SQLite) — which machine has which payload revision
+- Endpoints:
+  - `POST /register` — initial machine registration
+  - `POST /poll` — authenticated stub polls for instructions
+  - `GET /payload/{id}` — served over mTLS, stub downloads tarball
+  - Admin UI or CLI to push instructions to a machine
+- Signature key: server holds Ed25519 signing key; publishes public key for payload verification
+
+## Security model (must document in README)
+1. mTLS machine auth (client certs issued at registration)
+2. Payloads signed with Ed25519 — stub verifies before ANY execution
+3. Whitelisted instruction set, NOT arbitrary remote shell
+4. All traffic over TLS 1.3 (rustls)
+5. Defense-in-depth: even a compromised server can't push unsigned payloads
+
+## Deliverables
+1. Rust workspace that compiles
+2. Stub binary for each target (Linux musl static confirmed)
+3. Server binary + Let's Encrypt provisioning
+4. Payload signing helper script
+5. README with threat model + build/run instructions
+6. .gitea/workflows/ CI to build the target matrix
+
+## Constraints
+- No system lib dependencies for Linux (musl static)
+- flate2/miniz_oxide for compression (pure Rust)
+- rustls for TLS everywhere possible
+- Ed25519 (via ed25519-dalek or ring) for signing
+- Keep protocol/format identical across all OS targets
+- This is security-sensitive: verify-before-execute is non-negotiable